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Introduction
The literature of collective (but also individual) wage bargaining has been inspired by the cooperative solution of Nash (1950 Nash ( , 1953 . The so-called Nash-bargaining solution does not require transferable utility (like the so-called TU-games) and can be justi¯ed both axiomatically and by a non-cooperative representation (the so-called (Nash-)demand game) together with an ad hoc but nevertheless very in°uential idea of equilibrium selection (see Harsanyi and Selten, 1988, and GÄ uth and Kalkofen, 1989) . Of all e±cient agreements the Nash-bargaining solution picks the one for which the product of agreements dividends (what the parties get in addition to their con°ict payo®s) is maximal.
One crucial aspect of the Nash-bargaining solution is its symmetry axiom. Since in most bargaining situations one observes strategic (dis)advantages of one party, this has seriously restricted its predictive success (early experimental tests of the Nashbargaining solution are Kalisch, Milnor, Nash, and Nering, 1954, Nydegger and Owen, 1975 , and Roth and Malouf, 1979) . One therefore (see, for instance, Roth, 1979) has generalized the concept by maximizing the product of weighted agreement dividends. The non-negative exponents (the weights) add up to one and measure the power of the respective bargaining parties.
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A further generalization is due to Manning (1987) . His basic idea is that relative bargaining power (as measured by the exponents of agreement dividends) may depend on the issue when (collective) bargaining has to specify at least two di®erent issues, e.g. the (wage) tari® and the employment level. His sequential bargaining model assumes that parties (the trade union and its counterpart)¯rst determine the wage level and then the employment level where bargaining power of the two parties on the¯rst and second stage may be di®erent. Actually extreme asymmetries like these are typically assumed in (micro) economics. So sellers, e.g. monopolists, usually have dictatorial power concerning sales prices whereas customers can dictate how much they order.
A consequence of Manning 1987's generalization is that each pair of power indices in the unit sqare represents a di®erent bargaining model. This large variety can be viewed as a chance when trying to achieve a better¯t in econometric applications but also as a dilemma since hardly anything can be concluded for the result without knowing the two power indices. Our approach tries to resolve this dilemma by not imposing exogenously power indices but by deriving them endogenously. More speci¯cally, we will derive just one evolutionarily stable constellation of power indices in the unit square where the result may, of course, depend on the speci¯cation of the evolutionary model.
Methodologically our approach is one of indirect evolution. In indirect evolution one does not model directly the evolution of behavior but of its underlying (institutional) determinants like, for instance, preferences (see GÄ uth and Kliemt, 1998, for a conceptual discussion). For the case at hand collective bargaining is determined by the two power indices, as suggested by Manning (1987) . The power constellation may, however, change over time in view of past success. One may, for instance, switch to other constellations yielding a larger surplus. This, of course, implies a model of evolutionary selection which we provide by linking two parallel collective bargaining situations. By distinguishing several evolutionary models we can point out what determines each of the two power indices in the model of Manning (1987) .
The following section describes the fundamental set up, the special model of Manning (1987, section IV). We then link two parallel bargaining situations what allows us to compare the (evolutionary or reproductive) success of one power constellation with another. Section 4 studies the evolution of two-dimensional bargaining power for the (a±ne) speci¯cation of this linkage whereas section 5 is devoted to the homogeneous but non-linear case. In our Conclusions we summarize and discuss our results.
The basic model
Although this is more questionable when collective wage bargaining is more (above thē rm level) centralized, a party's bargaining power may depend on the issue, i.e. on the aspect which is to be negotiated like the size of the labour force or the wage tari®s. In collective bargaining at the¯rm level it may depend on the alternative jobs of employees whether the union is relatively strong or weak when negotiating how large the labour force should be. Similarly, the excess of status quo { wages over social bene¯ts and the (disutility of) work stress can be decisive for union's strength when bargaining about wage tari®s. In this sense of independent bargaining power for wages and employment Manning (1987) has generalized collective wage bargaining where he assumes that items (wages, respectively employment levels) are negotiated sequentially (see Manning, 1987 , section I, for some earlier models which qualify as special cases of his general model).
We only introduce the special model 2 of Manning (1987, section IV). The¯rm and the trade union negotiate both, ² the wage level w and ² the size L of the labour force.
Payo®s depend on the these two variables as follows:
is the¯rm's pro¯t resulting from total production f (L), depending positively on L, minus labour cost w ¢L. Let b (¸0) denote employees' aspiration level below which they would refuse to work, e.g. by organizing so-called wild strikes and thereby threatening the (relevance of the) trade union. Manning (1987, p. 128 ) refers to b as \the level of utility available to union members elsewhere". The trade union is both interested in a high excess wage (w ¡ b) and in a large labour force L. Its simple payo® function is
An important aspect of our study is to show ² how the level b can be endogenously determined by considering parallel collective negotiations, e.g. for other¯rms, branches, regions, and ² how this in°uences which bargaining strength one has to expect in the long run.
Parties (the¯rm management and the trade union)
²¯rst select w by maximizing
with p 2 [0; 1] measuring the union's bargaining power in wage bargaining and
for given w where now q 2 [0; 1] is the union's bargaining strength when negotiating the employment level L at a given wage w.
For the speci¯c production function
the solution can be easily derived as
and
By variation of p and q one can represent special cases in the collective bargaining literature, e.g. ² p = q (e±cient bargaining; MacDonald and Solow, 1981), Dunlop, 1944, and Oswald, 1982) , ² p 2 (0; 1), q = 0 (\right to manage-models"; Nickell, 1982).
Parallel collective negotiations
Collective negotiations do not occur in isolation but parallel with similar negotiations in other¯rms, branches, and/or regions with might in°uence each other mutually. Especially \the level of utility available to union members elsewhere" (Manning, 1987 , p. 128) will usually and strongly depend on what happens in other collective negotiations (for earlier attempts to capture such dependencies see GÄ uth, 1978). Let us refer by i = 1; 2 as the two 3 parallel collective negotiations whose payo®s are ¦ i (w i ; L i ) and U i (w i ; L i ), respectively, and whose bargaining strengths are given by
The outside option levels b i are assumed to be interrelated in the form 4 of
with c > 0 and 0 < d <p
Inserting (9) into the equation (7) for w i yields w i =°i + ± i w j for i; j = 1; 2 and i 6 = j (10)
The solution of the two equations (10) in w 1 and w 2 is given by
for i; j = 1; 2 and i 6 = j:
Now°i and ± i depend on p i and°j and ± j on p j so that w i depends on both, p i and p j , what justi¯es our shorthand w i = w i (p i ; p j ) for i; j = 1; 2 and i 6 = j
for the two equations (12) . Notice that due to 0 <¯< 1, p 1 ; p 2 2 [0; 1], c > 0, and the restriction for d one has
3 Since we want to apply evolutionary ideas when endogenizing the outside option level b, the number 2 re°ects the usual number of interacting individuals in evolutionary biology or game theory. It is here assumed for simpli¯cation and no restriction of our general approach.
4 By using the same parameters c, d, and ® we preserve the usual symmetry assumption in evolutionary biology and game theory. Allowing for i-speci¯c parameters would mean to decide between one or two population-interpretation, respectively evolutionary analysis. One could try to justify the speci¯cation of job search in case of con°ict in bargaining. A simpler interpretation would view c as determined by unemployment bene¯ts and d by how close the work skills, required in both¯rms are.
°i; ± i > 0 for i = 1; 2 (15) what implies w i (p i ; p j ) > 0 for i; j = 1; 2 and i 6 = j:
The solution wages are always well-de¯ned. Inserting them into (9) determines the two outside option levels b 1 and b 2 which in turn allow to compute the employment levels L 1 and L 2 with the help of equation (6) 
On the evolution of bargaining power
Compared to the simple set up of Manning's speci¯c model (Manning, 1987 , section IV) we so far have only endognized the outside option or minimum aspiration levels b 1 and b 2 by linking them to the agreed upon wage in the parallel labor negotiations. This establishes the only structural relationship between the two ongoing labor negotiations 5 . We do not only want to endogenize these minimum wage requirements b 1 and b 2 but also the power parameters p 1 ; p 2 ; q 1 ; q 2 2 [0; 1]. If these can assume all possible constellations (due to the linked negotiations this is now even more dimensional than in case of the Manning-model), hardly anything speci¯c, e.g. regarding e±ciency, can be claimed. Let us therefore try to somewhat reduce this large variety of possible power structures as represented by the vectors (p 1 ; q 1; p 2 ; q 2 ) 2 [0; 1] 4 . In doing so we rely on the indirect evolutionary approach which allows to derive the rules of the game instead of imposing them.
An evolutionary game ¡ = (M ; R(¢)) is de¯ned by ² the strategy/mutant set M which here is given by the set
of union's power parameters p and q and by ² the¯tness/success function R((p; q); (e p; e q))
measuring for all (e p; e q)-monomorphic populations how a strategy/mutant (p; q) would fare in such an environment.
What R((p; q); (e p; e q)) essentially measures is the tendency of changing the power structure in the sense that for R((p; q); (e p; e q)) > R((e p; e q); (e p; e q))
the power parameters (p; q) will more likely evolve (the processes which can trigger such adaptation will be discussed in the Discussion below). If there exists some vector
for all (p; q) 2 M with (p; q) 6 = (p ¤ ; q ¤ ) we will say that the power structure (p ¤ ; q ¤ ) is evolutionarily stable.
It remains to de¯ne the¯tness/success function R(¢) for the model at hand. Instead of imposing one speci¯c function R(¢) we consider several reasonable candidates like
In case (i) the basic assumption is that trade unions tend to move to power structures yielding higher wages. This makes sense if the power structure (p; q) is mainly resulting from trade union's investments in bargaining strength. A similar justi¯cation can be given for cases (iii) and (iv) where trade union's power structure is induced by the total wage bill, respectively by the wage share. Case (ii), where success is measured by the production amount, allows for a less biased in°uence on the power structure. Here the idea is that the power structure is e±ciency enhanced so that both parties could pro¯t from its adaptation.
Let us start with case (i), i.e. with the agreed upon wage level
for i; j = 1; 2 and i 6 = j
as the (evolutionary or reproductive) success measure. Since w i (¢) does not depend at all on the power indices q i and q j , all power indices
are (of course, only weakly) stable. From
we further obtain
For the other speci¯cations (ii), (iii), and (iv) an analytic result is (in our view, prohibitively) more di±cult. We therefore rely on the numerical plots in Figures 1, 2 , and 3 for these three speci¯cations whose clearcut results are as follows: Before discussing such results we want to confront them with those where the mathematical form of the mutual dependency of collective labor negotiations is quite di®erent.
Non-linear interdependencies of outside option levels
If one assumes
with 0 < ® < 1 for i; j = 1; 2 and i 6 = j;
instead of (9) the wages depend on the power indices p 1 and p 2 as follows:
where
According to (26) Proof. We prove the result for case (i); for the other cases the corresponding results are brie°y summarized in the Appendix. One has
With the help of
A 3 =¯¡ 1; and (32) 7 A formula comprising both cases, the linear interdependency (9) and the non-linear one in (26), would be b i = c i + d i w ® i : It would mean that (9) relies on ® = 1 and (26) on c i = 0 and d i = 1 and that we neglect other possibilities like, for instance, c i = 0 for ® = 1 for which the result is with w 1 = w 2 = 0 trivial. In our view, the a±ne linear speci¯cation (9) and the homogeneous non-linear one in (26) are the more natural assumptions how outside option wages are interrelated.
equation (29) can be expressed as
From ®;¯2 (0; 1) follows
what proves that only constellation (p ¤ ; q ¤ ) with p ¤ = 1 can be evolutionarily stable. Since w 1 does not depend on q 1 or q 2 there is no evolutionary adaptation of q, the trade union's power in employment negotiations. This is di®erent for the more comprehensive success measures (ii), (iii), or (iv) where one obtains p Thus the non-linear interdependency (26) of outside option values b i will soon or later lead to a so-called \union monopoly" (see Dunlop, 1944, and Oswald, 1982) with p ¤ i = 1 if the power structure is purely wage guided whereas the opposite result is obtained for the more comprehensive success measures.
Discussion
Our results are conveniently summarized by Table 1 which lists for i = 1; 2 the evolutionarily stable power constellations (p ¤ i ; q ¤ i ) for both types (\a±ne" or (9), \non-linear" or (26)) of linking the two parallel bargaining situations as well as for all four measures of (evolutionary or reproductive) success. By q (¤) i it is indicated that such levels are only weakly stable. The two linkage types yield the same results when success is measured by the achieved wage level w i (case (i)), by rational product (case (ii)), and by the total wage bill w i L i (case (iii)). For the remaining case the result di®ers: Whereas for the a±ne linkage it gets all the power in initial wage bargaining, the non-linear linkage makes it powerless in wage bargaining. Both linkages assign all the power in later employment bargaining to trade unions. If a power constellation (p i ; q i ) is better than (p j ; q j ), where \better" is de¯ned by one of the 4 di®erent success measures, why and how can the j-trade union (or both parties if the success measure suggests this) adapt a power constellation nearer to (p i ; q i )? That such adaptation takes place rests on two assumptions, namely ² that power parameters can change over time ² in ways indicated by superior success.
The¯rst assumption seems hardly restrictive. The strength of trade unions is in-°u enced by many factors like their participation rates (which percentage of the labor force is unionized), the general employment situation etc. which are changing over time. Let us therefore concentrate on the latter assumption above. Here the justi¯cation will strongly depend on the success measure.
If the wage level is the measure of success the change of union power should result from power speci¯c investments by trade unions. If, for instance, (p i ; q i ) yields higher wages than (p j ; q j ) since trade union i has a higher participation rate than union j, the latter will (re)direct its activities to increase its own participation rate. Similar arguments should apply in case of the total wage bill or of the wage quota as success measure.
For the social output (case (ii)) as the measure of success) the adaptation of the power constellation over time could rely on investments by both parties or result from public opinion changes. In a society where capital assets are widely dispersed even the employer side might not object to power structures inspiring a larger social output. If in another region the social surplus is much higher, public opinion will support all attempts to imitate the example of the other region. This would be especially obvious when public opinion directly in°uences the power constellation in the sense that trade unions are only strong when their policy is publicly supported.
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